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The increasing spread in the yield between Greek and German sovereign debt in 
early 2010 presaged a financial crisis that could spill over not only into other Euro 
zone economies, but the entire EU.*1 Since then growth prospects have evaporated 
in some member states, and in many regions, unemployment remains perilously 
high. The EU is facing its greatest challenge to its fundamental viability as an 
economic and political entity. Finn Laursen’s book does not only portray what 
is happening in the European Union as a matter of bond yields and debt-to-GDP 
ratios. It is an overview of the major policy challenges the EU is facing and the 
decisions its leaders face about its future, from how to stabilise debt markets to 
building democratic legitimacy to the future of EU expansion. It is an introduc-
tion to modern EU policy requirements, as well as an exploration of some of the 
more subtle tensions in certain policy areas underlying the more prominent (i.e., 
financial) aspects of the current crisis. 
Kurt Huebner’s chapter, “Eurozone: Creeping Decay, Sudden Death or Magi-
cal Solution?”, presents three visions of the Euro’s future: more of today’s mud-
dling through, a partial or complete breakup of the Euro zone, or the “magical 
* In the book review section Acta Oeconomica recently reviewed István Bences̕ book covering 
the same subject. See page 159–162. – Editors̕ note.
Zack Kramer, Student at the Department of Political Science of the Central European University 
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solution” – full political, fiscal, and banking union. Huebner makes known his 
dissatisfaction with the slow response by the member states and the EU to debt 
market instability. He presents us with a model of the equilibrium the crisis has 
assumed, in which sovereign debt crisis creates banking crisis, which in turn 
creates macroeconomic crisis, then democratic crisis, ultimately reinforcing the 
sovereign debt crisis and creating a loss of political legitimacy. The only solution 
Huebner sees is a leap into simultaneous fiscal, political, and banking union, as it 
would prove the resolve of the European project to keep moving forward. 
Imtiaz Hussain’s chapter, “Europe after the Greek Default: Widening, Deepen-
ing, or Splitting?”, shows how “a Europe divided by economic culture, and overly 
top-heavy decision making” (p. 135) created an environment in which instability 
in Greece contaminated the entire Euro zone. The author argues that EU financial 
decision-making is increasingly out of the hands of national leaders, becoming 
the province of the German financial sector and foreign creditors. This environ-
ment could lead to a strong backlash against austerity and supra-nationalism. The 
essence of Hussain’s chapter is that a two-speed, creditor/debtor dynamic created 
the Greek financial collapse, that the Eurogroup could have prevented if Chancel-
lor Merkel had been willing to sacrifice her popularity, and decision processes in 
the Euro zone will widen the gap between core and peripheral member states. 
In “The Eurozone Crisis and the Fiscal Treaty: Implications for the Social Di-
mension and Democracy”, Robert Finbow looks beyond the economic implica-
tions of the financial crisis and the new fiscal treaty. According to him, “the new 
system (interim governments pandering to markets, fiscal treaty, ESM) strength-
ens an agenda of austerity and bureaucratic constraint” (p. 46). He summarises 
the provisions of the new fiscal treaty and the European Stability Mechanism, 
concluding that both serve to strengthen technocracy at the expense of democracy 
by conferring greater authority to unelected bureaucrats. Finbow argues that it 
may become difficult to impose austerity measures on weak economies without 
an eventual democratic backlash, and that Germany and the creditor states must 
consider the broader implications of austerity measures, not simply the economic 
outcomes. Otherwise, he envisions an increasingly delegitimised EU.
Ece Ozlem Atikcan’s “Direct Democracy: Remedying the Democratic Deficit” 
investigates another, older criticism of democracy in the European Union: the 
idea that the structure of the EU is inherently elitist and makes real democracy 
difficult or impossible. According to him, “rising Euroskepticism since the 1990s 
has shown that the tacit approval of the public has come to an end” (p. 117). In 
examining the role that direct democracy could play in connecting the EU with its 
citizens, he argues that direct democracy cannot bring democratic legitimacy to 
the EU before the public commits to informing itself. Atikcan’s wariness towards 
direct democracy essentially revolves around the idea of EU policymakers and 
BOOK REVIEWS 155
Acta Oeconomica 65 (2015)
institutions as detached from the public, which has only a vague, depoliticised 
notion of EU decisions and policies. The chapter closes with the argument that 
before direct democracy can improve the legitimacy of the EU, the Union needs 
to be able to communicate better with its citizenry. 
Alasdair Blair examines the UK’s relations with the European project and the 
Euro in “Britain and Currency Union”. He notes the inability of British leaders 
to ever convince their electorate that European integration has anything to offer 
their country and the complementary lack of support for pro-European measures 
in British media. Blair holds that this general inability to create popular support 
for integration and a widely held fear of the loss of sovereignty translated into an 
unwillingness to involve Britain in the monetary union. The same pattern ensued 
with the Exchange Rate Mechanism – Britain was slow to join and did so without 
a political mandate, leading to an opt-out clause in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty 
and withdrawal from ERM the next year. Blair ends with speculation on the fu-
ture of UK–Euro zone relations, in which the crisis only reinforces the divisions 
between the Euro countries and Britain. He concludes that the new fiscal agree-
ment, combined with a persistent lack of public engagement, makes the prospect 
of the UK adopting the Euro or increasing its EU support even less likely than it 
ever was. 
Ruben Zaiotti’s “Chronic Anxiety: Schengen and the Fear of Enlargement” 
evaluates current prospects of expanding the Schengen Area into Romania and 
Bulgaria in light of its previous enlargements in Italy and Scandinavia. Common 
threads running across the past and present scenarios are identified to dispel the 
sense of otherness surrounding Romania and Bulgaria. The author notes the con-
cerns surrounding the Romanian and Bulgarian Schengen applications despite 
their EU membership, concerns “that echo those directed against countries that 
are, or may become in the medium to long term, EU membership candidates” 
(p. 154). Zaiotti sees the controversy surrounding their accession as a product 
of “enlargement anxiety”. The current situation is compared with that of Italy, 
which created a similar controversy before acceding because of concerns about 
the movement of North Africans across the Mediterranean, and with the Scandi-
navian accession, which sparked little of the same controversy, both because of 
the geography of those countries and the general perception as secure. The recent 
Franco-Italian affair in which France imposed extraordinary border controls to 
block the entry of refugees fleeing the chaos of the Arab Spring is used to il-
lustrate that a stigma remains on Italy because of its perception as a weak link 
in the Schengen zone, even though the predicted influx of immigrants was only 
a fraction of what was anticipated. The author concludes with a call to approach 
prospective Schengen members with an open mind. 
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In “Crossroads of Integration? The Future of Schengen in the Wake of the 
Arab Spring”, Kiran K. Phull and John B. Sutcliffe examine the effects of Middle 
Eastern political instability on EU immigration and the integrity of Schengen 
border controls. The chapter pays particular attention to the Franco-Italian Affair. 
While the prospect of mass migration from Tunisia was the ostensible motivation 
for France to impose extraordinary border controls, the authors view the French 
reaction as a product of internal dynamics, “underlying factors contributing to 
a general thickening of the EU’s internal and external borders, for instance, the 
ongoing sovereign debt crisis … the growth in recent years of the European far-
right…” (p. 170). The crisis has created an environment of tension and fear, in 
which the basic assumptions that the Schengen Agreement is built on come un-
der scrutiny. We are cautioned against assuming that the incident will alter the 
Schengen acquis, on the grounds that it was not the first time a nation unilaterally 
imposed border controls, that it involved third country nationals and not Schen-
gen area citizens, and because border control remains a core part of the notion of 
state sovereignty. 
In “Common Agricultural Policy: The Right Path versus Blind Alleys”, Jacek 
Chotkowski and Benon Gazinski analyse proposed CAP reforms and “demon-
strate why it is necessary to change the philosophy governing the CAP” (p. 83). 
The original goals of the CAP (primarily food security) are contrasted with mod-
ern needs (food quality, environmental protection). Current reform proposals on 
the negotiating table are examined, the main goal of these being to simplify and 
deregulate agriculture and its subsidisation while making it more competitive. 
The thrust of the chapter comes with a critique of CAP reforms proposed so far. 
It is written largely from a Polish perspective, but is relevant across the various 
member states. The authors imply that much of the proposed change is just idle 
talk, especially to farmers in the new member states. To conclude, they call upon 
Poland to lead the Central/ Eastern European agricultural sector.
The motivations underlying the EU–Canada free-trade agreement are explored 
in the chapter “New Challenges for EU Policy Making: Why is the EU Pursuing 
a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada?” by Stefanie 
Rosskopf. She analyses the strategic framework within which the decision to pur-
sue an FTA was made, citing the 2006 and 2010 EU Trade Policies as the prime 
determinants of EU trade strategy. The two Trade Policies “laid out a framework 
under which new bilateral Free Trade Agreements were to emerge. The market 
potential and the level of protection against EU export industries were identified 
as the two key economic criteria on the basis of which FTAs should be pursued” 
(p. 106). 
The EU and the Eurozone Crisis surveys a broad swath of EU policy, from 
solutions to the financial crisis to improving democratic legitimacy. The authors 
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are unified in the belief that there is a way forward for the EU if it is willing to 
integrate, compromise, and reform. Huebner’s call for full political, banking, and 
fiscal union comes in the wake of similar proposal of a deeper union by pre vious 
writers (Marzinotto et al. 2011; Beck 2012). The ambitious scope of the idea 
allows one to speculate widely as to the benefits it could create for the Union. 
However, it also leaves much room for questioning the long-term implications of 
such a major change. Rushing into integration could have messy consequences, 
which Huebner chooses not to address, instead lamenting the unlikeliness of such 
an outcome.
Hussain’s chapter questions how the Euro zone allowed the situation in Greece 
to spiral out of control and where the financial crisis is steering the Union. How-
ever, his ad hominem attacks against Angela Merkel rely on assumptions about 
her motives, assuming she put electability before her duty. Furthermore, his vi-
sion of a periphery increasingly at the mercy of external forces removes the bur-
den of action from national leaders in the EU’s distressed economies when they 
are most in need of leadership. 
Two authors raise important questions about the preservation of democracy in 
the face of crisis. Finbow’s view that EU efforts at creating fiscal stability jeop-
ardise national level democracy largely matches Scharpf’s (2011) and Kopits’ 
(2012) concerns about the vulnerability of national governments and their con-
stituencies in the face of supranational fiscal regulation. Atikcan’s analysis of the 
shortfall of direct democracy given an uninformed electorate is also sound, and 
though his call for more substantial public discourse on EU legislation and a more 
informed populace is nothing new, it is all the more relevant given the scale of 
decision-making at EU level in response to the crisis. 
The sections on the UK’s relationship with the Euro, and on EU expansion and 
the Schengen zone serve as reminders that the European project is not a static 
and lifeless thing. Blair’s conclusion that the UK’s accession to the Euro zone is 
unlikely is unsurprising, but it shows that it is not a product of present circum-
stances. The currency union was not an arbitrary initiative, but the outcome of 
a long process of integration on the continent, a process that cannot be undone 
overnight by a crisis. Zaiotti, Phull, and Sutcliffe all reach a similar conclusion 
on the Schengen Area: that the present fears about expanding it are not new, and 
that the open border still stands as an enormous achievement in European inte-
gration. Zaiotti’s call for understanding towards the applicant states, and Sutcliffe 
and Phull’s conclusion that the Franco-Italian affair does not seriously undermine 
Schengen are important indications of the project’s endurance.
The chapters on CAP reform and the Canadian FTA both speak to the potential 
of the European Union despite the crisis. The criticisms of proposed CAP reforms 
illustrate how integral it remains in many states, and CAP’s potential to bridge the 
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gap between old and new members with necessary reforms. The authors provide 
real insight into an often-overlooked area, from a marginalised (i.e. Polish) per-
spective. Likewise, the CETA chapter calls attention to the EU’s formidable clout 
as a trade bloc. If the CETA is seen as the first in what will become a collection 
of Free Trade Agreements, the European Union could become the world leader in 
trade liberalisation. Rosskopf’s chapter helps us to envision a post-crisis Europe 
living up to its potential economic influence in the world. 
The limitation inherent in a book of such brevity yet such scope is that it can 
never serve as an exhaustive analysis of any one problem or policy area. What we 
have instead is an engaging and insightful introduction to the modern European 
Union and the issues it faces. This book cannot be viewed as a manual for resolv-
ing the EU crisis, but must rather be seen as a guide to understanding its context. 
It does not attempt to grapple with the realities of the EU’s institutions or the dif-
ficulty of reform consensus. It should serve as a resource to scholars of political 
economy seeking an understanding of the crisis, particularly the impact it has had 
beyond the balance sheets of the European Union. 
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István Benczes (ed.)
Deficit and Debt in Transition. The Political Economy of Public Finances in 
Central and Eastern Europe
Budapest: CEU Press, 2014, 242 pp. 
In the 1990s, budget deficit and public indebtedness became one of the most 
popular topics of public debates and theoretical investigations.*2 At first, after 
the publication of Buchanan’s book, Democracy in Deficit, it seemed to be the 
field of interest of political scientists and political economists, but a decade later, 
macroeconomists picked up these subjects, too. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
Alesina – Tabellini (1990), Alesina – Perotti (1994, 1995) and, later, Perssons – 
Tabellini (2002, 2006), Drazen – Eslava (2005), and Brander – Drazen (2005) 
identified the underlying problems as a consequence of the fierce fight between 
political parties for seizing and keeping political power. A balanced budget and 
the avoidance of large public debt are important for sustainable growth, but they 
are also evidence of good governance. 
Economics always reflects the behaviour of economic players, among them 
politicians, voters and governments, as well as adaptive or rational expectations 
of market forces, sometimes without a knowledge of what they are doing (Karl 
Marx), and deficit is also produced without an express intention to do so. Deficits 
and growing public debt are produced even in the more developed countries, but it 
is also the tendency in most countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where 
the economic and political transformation is taking place. The pheno menon of 
budget deficit and public debt is identified and analysed in the recently published 
book of Hungarian economists under the double title, Deficit and Debt in Transi-
tion. The Political Economy of Public Finances in Central and Eastern Europe.
The 9 studies and a short introduction offer more than a thorough glimpse into 
the problems of public finances of CEE countries, but less than a summary of the 
common and special features of transformation in the field of public finances. 
The appealing volume of papers consists of the application of the different metho-
dologies of newly-developed directions of schools such as Varieties of Capitalism 
(VoC), New Institutional Economics (NIE), and Historical Institutionalism (HI), 
as well as the identification of the significance of trust-building, and the relation-
* In the book review section Acta Oeconomica (2014/2) reviewed Beáta Farkas̕ book covering 
the same subject. – Editors̕ note.
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ship between economic freedom and public debt. In addition to theoretical stud-
ies, the selection of papers comprises also case studies about the special problems 
of the Baltics, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Croatia.
As the concept of the Editor was to emphasise the underlying inherited eco-
nomic and social structure, which might have an influence on the efforts of gov-
ernments to consolidate the public finances of their home country, the volume 
reflects a quite valuable historical aspect: namely the application of path depend-
ency. In my recently published book (Csillag 2013), I tried to underline the sig-
nificance of the inheritance, because the economic performance of the countries 
is dependant on what past they would like to get rid of, and what the values, 
institutions to be preserved are. I emphasised that deficit and public debt are the 
outcomes and not the objectives of the complex web of interactions of the politi-
cal players. If political actors are able to grasp that the well-being of a nation is 
the fruit of the good performance of the economy, rather than a gift of the gov-
ernment, only then are they able to avoid the greatest temptation of newly born 
democracies: securing of the support of voters through the reduction of taxes or 
increased transfers. These are the sins what we can aptly call macroeconomic 
populism (Dornbusch – Edwards 1991).
Are there any benchmarks of good governance of public finances? Is it worth-
while for the CEE countries to copy the more developed, the old democracies? 
Are there any convergences of mistakes or errors which will inevitably produce 
a high budget deficit, a low rate of growth, or a highly piled public debt? The 
present volume convinced us that there is not much difference between the more 
developed democracies’ derangements, tactical tricks for keeping governmental 
power, and the infantile disorders of the newly born democracies. 
One of the most valuable analyses of the book is the short contribution of 
Vera Takács – István Benczes, “The Strategic Use of Public Debt in Central and 
Eastern Europe”. The authors are able to demonstrate which countries are in-
clined to apply public debt as a strategic variable in political competition, and 
why others refrain from the application of this variable. Their paper is one of the 
first attempts to identify the application of the classic model of Alesina – Tabel-
lini (1990), which showed how incumbents of political actions are building the 
constraints against the choices of future governments. The case study focusing 
on the Hungarian case, also written by Benczes, adds to the application of the use 
of public debt as a strategic variable of the historical aspects, namely the influ-
ence of the inherited post-communist Kádár-era:13 “the premature welfare state” 
1  János Kádár was a Hungarian communist leader and the General Secretary of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party, presiding over the country from 1956 until his retirement in 1988. 
His 32-year term as General Secretary covered most of the period the People’s Republic of 
Hungary existed.
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(Kornai 1992). In this quite interesting paper, “Critical Junctures and Unintended 
Consequences”, Benczes is able to alloy historical aspects – even Braudel’s “long 
duration” concept is recalled – categories and methodology of political economy. 
“Path-dependency matters” is the main explanation of his paper for the insur-
mountable deficit problems of Hungary.
The volume features two interesting experiments to apply the new methods 
of VoC and Economic Freedom relations. Oliver Tveidler’s “Economic Freedom 
and Public Finances in Central and Eastern Europe” and Zsolt Szabó’s “Varieties 
of Capitalism and Public Finances in Central and Eastern Europe” are also part of 
the volume, but the results of the application are not too convincing.
A quite promising study by András Olivér Németh looks at the political busi-
ness cycle hypothesis. It is a valuable contribution because it demonstrates the 
findings of the theory on political business cycles, and applies the methods on the 
experiences of the CEE countries. Especially noteworthy is the case study on the 
Baltics written by Zsolt Kutasi, as it convinces the reader that macroeconomic 
populism can have a thousand faces. If a country is able to avoid a high rate of 
redistribution, or inherited public debt, the desire to satisfy the impatience of the 
population to consume by financing it from foreign savings will end the fine eco-
nomic performance once the channels of foreign savings are blocked.
For the present reviewer, the most valuable paper is Dóra Győrffy’s study, 
“Structural Reforms in a Low-Trust Environment: The Case of Slovakia”, about 
the trust building capacity in Eastern Europe. The paper analyses from all aspects 
why it was possible to introduce structural reforms for the better performance of 
the economy and for the sake of accession, which resulted the consolidation of 
public finances as well.
In the book, we have the chance to read about the Polish and the Croatian de-
velopment, based on the research of Judit Kozenkow and Fruzsina Sigér. These 
two studies are also instructive. It would be nice to believe that not only graduate 
students, but practicing politicians will be also able to learn lessons from this 
valuable book on public debt and budget deficit.
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Tomislav LEKO
Thomas Mayer
Europe’s Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the Euro 
London – New York: Anthem Press, 2012, 262 pp.
The book provides a thorough analysis of the common European currency.*4 As 
Thomas Mayer worked for the Deutsche Bank Research Group and for the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, he offers a unique insight into the deficiencies of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and the further steps that need to be taken in 
order to stabilise and increase the efficiency of the EMU. This book contributes to 
the ongoing discussion of reform triggered by the crisis. Most of the attention in 
the academic discussion is on the idea of a banking union as a further step towards 
European integration, which incorporates an EU-wide bank resolution mecha-
* In the book review section, Acta Oeconomica (2014/1) Dóra Györffys̕ book covering the same 
subject. – Editors̕ note.
Tomislav Leko, Deputy Director General at Model European Union Zagreb (MEUZ) 2015. E-mail: 
leko.tomislav@gmail.com
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nism, deposit insurance scheme, and supervisory mechanism. Mayer concentrates 
in his work on the characteristics of the Euro and the internal problems in the 
structure of the EMU that need to be changed. The book gives a clear-cut analysis 
of the EMU and presents issues that preceded the EMU in order to become more 
stable in times of crises. Mayer contributed to the discussion and his idea of the 
European Monetary Fund (EMF) is mirrored in the further steps EMU countries 
took to reform the system of crisis management. The European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and, later, the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
established a system whose task is similar to the idea of the EMF and Thomas 
Mayer’s reasoning can explain issues that the new reform had to solve. 
The book is aimed to give an image of the state of affairs in the EMU before 
the establishment of the ESM to academics, policy-makers, and others who are 
responsible for proposing reforms to this structure. The historical overview of 
different monetary arrangements in the world also contributes to the discussion 
around the future EMU structure and gives the reader a clear reasoning why cer-
tain elements of the EMU are present, and which other elements should be incor-
porated in order to fix its structure. 
The book starts with the historical perspective of the European unification 
with the analysis of the incentives that led European countries towards deeper 
integration (Chapter 1), but it is mostly aimed at presenting the role of the Euro 
in the process of unification. In this timeframe of European integration, Allied 
powers decided to integrate Germany into the European structure without the 
burden of money reparations as after the First World War. This section on closer 
political union ends with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the changes in Europe it 
brought. Chapter 2, “No longer a Question of War and Peace”, focuses on Ger-
man unification and French fears that this could cause problems in the European 
Economic Community. France wanted firmer integration of Germany in the EEC 
in exchange for backing German unification. The aftermath of the unification and 
the new incoming Treaty (Maastricht) made the idea of monetary union crucial 
to completing the European Internal Market and therefore more attractive to Ger-
man and other EEC governments. 
Chapter 3, entitled “History of Failures”, presents different types of monetary 
integration schemes (Latin Monetary Union, Scandinavian monetary integra-
tion, United States of America, etc.) that failed to maintain themselves. These 
examples all lacked centralised money issuance and lacked strict fiscal discipline 
among the participating countries. The main problem identified by the author 
lies in “the ability to create money and thus to obtain credit unavailable by other 
means”. The lessons here were used in the establishment of the EMU and the au-
thor highlights that previous experience with monetary unions structures the aim 
of preventing the monetisation of government debt.
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From the presentation of monetary unions in history, the author analyses 
the beginnings of the Euro in Chapter 4, “The Euro’s Happy Childhood and Its 
Abrupt End”. The ECB quickly gained ground and “the Euro developed into 
the second-most important international reserve currency after the US dollar” 
(p. 79). However, in the author’s opinion, the ECB failed to set interest rates 
strictly symmetrically in an environment of increased divergences in economic 
growth (p. 89). Another three factors that contributed to the crisis were, firstly, 
inefficient bank supervisors, secondly, the inability of national fiscal policies to 
counter country-specific effects of the common monetary policy, and thirdly, the 
lack of means to impose discipline in fiscal policy among EMU members by the 
Stability and Growth Pact (p. 94). The common denominator of the whole EMU 
structure is the deficiency in the legal framework of the EMU, which was caught 
without a crisis management framework when the financial crisis emerged. 
The lack of crisis management mechanisms is discussed in Chapter 5, “A Cri-
sis of Legitimacy”. The author poses the dilemma encountered by the ECB board, 
whether to end their support to banks in the Euro zone at the cost of a collec-
tive failure (p. 109), or to fund those banks and government bonds of indebted 
countries with the aim of “extending credit to governments cut off from capital 
markets because of unsound fiscal policies” (p. 111). The author concludes that 
“central bank’s exclusive focus on the purchasing power of the common money 
and governments’ full liability for their financial decisions had been destroyed by 
the way the Euro crisis had been managed” (p. 114). 
Although many critics accuse the ECB for exceeding its mandate, Chapter 
6, entitled “A (Hidden) Balance-of-Payments”, answers why the EMU did not 
collapse immediately after the burst of the credit bubble in 2007–2008 (p. 117). 
The author gave an example of deficiencies in the EMU monetary transmission 
system, specifically the TARGET 2 system that is based on inter-bank lending of 
Euros and therefore dependent on the interaction and the trust that exists between 
the banks in the Euro zone. Banks in the GIIPS countries obtained a rising share 
of ECB loans to compensate for the loss of credit from banks in other countries 
from which they import products (p. 126). The conclusion that is presented by 
the author is that “continuous funding of balance-of-payments deficits of EMU 
member countries with money created by the ECB would lead to an excess supply 
of money and eventually raise inflation in the surplus countries” (p. 133.)
Chapter 7, entitled “Forward or Backward”, introduces proposals for the further 
consolidation of the EMU. As the Treaty of Lisbon showed, the intergovernmen-
tal character of the EU has been kept and further transfer of national sovereignty 
in fiscal policy cannot be shifted to the supranational level. Mayer argues that 
the European method of integration in which elites would pull citizens towards 
deeper integration lost its significance with the exclusion of the threat of conflict 
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in Europe, and the public rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in France and the Neth-
erlands were both signs of this shift (p. 139). This kind of integration would be a 
double-edged sword because national sovereignty in a European political union 
could be restricted by the common interest aggregated at the European level as 
it is often argued in case of the limitation of the sovereignty of local or regional 
entities by the national level in each state (p. 139). The potential divisions that 
would occur could harm the whole process of integration. 
An important point the author highlights is that although the system was pro-
hibiting the bail-out of member states and banks, the ECB did not have any other 
choice than to engage the secondary market to help governments fund their debt. 
One of the main reasons for the rising debt of member states in the Euro zone was 
that “financial markets did not believe in the no-bail out clause of the Maastricht 
Treaty until the beginning of the Euro crisis and it treated government debt of 
EMU member states as if it had been issued under joint liability” (p. 140). This 
way, states enjoyed “unlimited” access to borrowing at very low cost (p. 141). In 
the author’s opinion, the casualties of this system were fiscal discipline in the en-
tire EMU and the price stability influenced by the constant injection of money by 
the ECB on the market to fund government debt issuance. Therefore, “the essence 
of political union would have to be giving the national sovereignty to EU level 
and not fiscal transfers (bilateral or from funds) and joint debt issuance”. The 
author suggests that the EMU can only be stabilised if it is pulled back to its de-
fault principles of a common currency which is independent of politics (p. 142). 
He believes that the European Central Bank (ECB) should aim at price stability 
and lending to solvent banks. If the ECB would refrain from funding and helping 
with maintaining the stability of government’s finances, who would finance the 
debt for governments when the markets have no trust in sovereign bonds? Mayer 
gives a few possibilities on how to transition from the current system to new-rules 
based system that would help to re-stabilise via a lender of last resort, the EMF 
(p. 145). Elements enforced by the EMF would be pressure for adjustment in 
fiscal policies on the national level, spreading the threat of sovereign bankruptcy 
with the consequence of being cut off from capital market (p. 145), and the joint 
liability of EMU member states for a certain amount of the debt in case of default. 
The scope of influence of this institution would also include debt restructuring on 
a case-by-case basis. 
The EMF would fill the vacuum in crisis management and it would play the 
role comparable to the IMF for the international financial system. Chapter 8, 
symbolically entitled “In Search of a Lender of Last resort”, highlights the issue 
of identifying the institution which would give the crucial financial injection to 
states that are insolvent and are in danger of default. Until now, “[the ECB] lent at 
low rates even to banks whose solvency was in doubt through the justification of 
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those government bond purchases with the goal of oiling the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism” (p. 149). Conditionality was also used to create legitimacy for 
the funding of member states that found themselves in financial deadlock. As the 
author rightly stated, “when [the ECB] lends to an insolvent debtor it devalues the 
money it creates and when it lends to an illiquid debtor it prevents unnecessary 
defaults” (p. 153).
The discussion about the roots of this crisis moves to the nature of the “flat 
money system” which stops the “material anchoring of money” to gold, estab-
lishes the central bank as an independent actor in controlling the supply of money 
and thus influences its purchasing power. In addition to the central banks’ role, 
the author highlights a few elements that influenced distortions on the financial 
market, namely the diversification of portfolio packages in which “credit was ex-
tended on the belief that credit risks could be accurately measured and minimized 
… where risky single assets were aggregated into an asset pool with seemingly 
low risk” (p. 189). This is explained as the combination of “constructivist mon-
etary policies that followed inflation targets (and Taylor rule) with a laissez-faire 
approach to the financial sector” (p. 190). The author points out that legal tender 
in this case can only come from the central bank. This caused the perception of 
the lack of crisis mechanisms and the need to establish an institution based on 
IMF principles that will provide adjustment credits to governments under policy 
conditionality (p. 153). The author debates whether the new EMF would be more 
efficient with the access to the ECB financing with clear conditionality towards 
structural reforms in the debtor country. Why did EU member states decide to 
save the Euro and to share the burden with indebted countries by giving money 
in those Funds?
This is answered in Chapter 9, which deals with “The Politics of the Euro 
Rescue” and perceptions of what EU member states should do in order to stabi-
lise indebted countries. In this system’s weak legal framework for dealing with 
the crisis, discussion of reform brings the issue of burden-sharing to the table. It 
is critical to ask who should pay the debt of countries that are indebted and are 
threatened by the default. The author highlights the division between Germany’s 
conditionality and claims of other countries such as France and Italy that urge 
for a more sympathetic approach to the demands for help (p. 162). As a result 
of these discussions, it is often discussed who profited the most from the mon-
etary arrangement and the common currency. When considering gains from the 
monetary union, Thomas Mayer concludes that “the biggest gains came from 
lower interest rates and the GDP effects of more intra-EMU trade” (p. 164). Tho-
mas Mayer analyses the position of Germany in the EMU and concludes that 
the German strong currency policy was beneficial for both capital and labour in 
Germany, and that the exit from the EMU might be a possibility for Germany if 
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the Euro becomes “softer currency”. With these claims, the author refutes all the 
critics and claims that Germany is the one that profited the most from the EMU 
arrangement and therefore needs to “pay the bill”. When assessing the poten-
tial solutions for the payment of sovereign and bank debt, Germany insisted on 
the financial participation of private-sector creditors and on bail-in packages that 
would be paid by speculating bondholders. Germany accepted the involvement of 
the IMF and the strict conditionality towards countries that apply for help. How-
ever, Angela Merkel saw that the forgiveness of the debt of private creditors was 
a false move and “declared that private sector participation in the restructuring 
of Greek’s public debt was exceptional and unique and would not be repeated in 
other countries” (p. 172). Despite these restrictions and strong attitudes, Germany 
accepted the ECB’s reaction on the market while working on a new arrangement 
outside of the institutional architecture of the EMU, which had to be dealt with 
in a separate treaty because the UK vetoed a revision of the EU Treaties (p. 180). 
The New Treaty meant further austerity measures, and was criticised because of 
its policies that potentially undermine growth. The main idea promoted in the new 
crisis management structure by the author was that “fiscal austerity is needed to 
restore confidence in the sustainability of government finances, stabilization and 
restructuring of the banking sector is needed to rebuild confidence in the financial 
sector, and structural reform is needed to improve external competitiveness and 
restore confidence in the external solvency” (p. 182). The book cites a wide range 
of reasons that fuel the opinion that the Euro must be maintained and that the col-
lapse of the common currency would lead to the dissolution of the Union. 
The author claims that “if [the Euro is] managed as non-political money in an 
EMU where member states are liable for their sovereign financial decisions, the 
Euro offers the participating countries the opportunity of crafting a hard currency 
that can stand on its own against the currencies of other global economic powers” 
(p. 185). In Chapter 10, entitled “Why Europe Needs the Euro”, the author clearly 
states that the EMU brings many advantages to the European Union. However, 
the strong Euro needs a stronger EMU and in the Chapter 11 (“A New Founda-
tion for EMU”), the author summarises the whole message of the book, that is 
“to establish a federation of sovereign states where interstate fiscal transfers play 
only a minor role, member states are fully responsible for their financial affairs, 
the common currency is managed by a politically independent Central bank and 
economic and financial crises can be effectively dealt with” (p. 198). In this con-
cept, the author states that member states would transfer part of the national sov-
ereignty to the supranational level and this structure would have five fundamental 
blocks. The first block is the full responsibility of governments for their financial 
decisions and fiscal solvency with the option of exiting the EMU and allowing 
default (without exiting the EU) (p. 198). The second and third block aim at the 
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Central bank’s responsibility for price stability (while overseeing the emergence 
of asset price bubbles) and its role as a lender of last resort conducted in close 
cooperation with the European Systemic Risk Board and a European Monetary 
Fund (EMF) (p. 199). In addition to the role of the Central Bank, the role of the 
EMF would be to “give financial support to governments cut off from capital mar-
kets in return for binding commitments” to restore solvency (p. 201). The fourth 
block of this structure is the EMF’s role in the supervision of national economic 
policies for consistency while providing sovereign bond insurance, management, 
and funding adjustment programs (debt restructuring) of indebted member states 
(p. 201). The fifth block includes the EFSF that ensures financial and banking 
regulation to safeguard financial stability and provide common deposit insurance 
and a mechanism for restructuring or resolution of insolvent banks (bank resolu-
tion mechanism) (p. 202). 
To conclude, the author states that “no set of rules imposed by Brussels can 
replace the disciplinary influence of the risk of failure” (p. 215). The author’s 
arguments in this book: “de-politisation” of money, developing the framework of 
crisis management and the reform of the EMU, raising trust in the financial sys-
tem by aligning fiscal policies and the comprehensive surveillance of the bank-
ing system will indeed lead to a stronger and more effective European Monetary 
Union. The arguments presented in this book are well elaborated and the author 
clearly states that the issue of moral hazard is of extreme importance when con-
sidering the future structure of the EMU and member states have to be in constant 
fear of default, while wrongly led fiscal policies should be punished by the mar-
ket to eliminate the moral hazard. However, as markets play a valuable role for 
every country, it is hard to “enforce” this default immediately, without the insur-
ance of the rest of the Union and Euro zone member states should be careful in 
stabilising the EMU. Since the market held sovereign bonds as equally safe prior 
to the crisis, this was also a form of joint liabilities without it being an official 
goal. During the growth of the Euro zone, none of the member states officially 
requested the single supervisory mechanism and the enforcement of the Stability 
and Growth Pact, and this led to the crisis. In my opinion, Eurobonds would have 
the same characteristic as the system prior to the crisis and it would only func-
tion if fiscal policies would follow the fiscal framework defined in the Treaties. 
I agree that the moral hazard caused by cheap credit shows that fiscal policies 
were not punished in time and that this was wrong. Speaking about the time when 
the crisis began, Mayer obviously shows the internal problems of the crisis man-
agement framework inside the EU Treaties and calls for a change in the EMU cri-
sis management structure where the main role will be played by the EMF and not 
by the ECB. The ECB has its mission independent from any market distortions 
caused by unsustainable fiscal policies. In addition to this, the author identifies 
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the important aspect of the banking system, which is the need for a supervisor that 
will oversee big systematic banks to counter any bigger bubbles on the financial 
market. Furthermore, it is important to mention the input in this discussion given 
by examples of past monetary unions in Europe that identify significantly similar 
problems before their collapse which are fiscal imbalances, the monetisation of 
deficits, the emergence of balance-of-payments deficits among regions, etc. Al-
though many critics of the book claim that the times are different and it is hard to 
compare two different eras, I think Mayer’s input could easily gain ground and 
help shape the EMU structure. Another contribution to the discussion that Mayer 
pinpointed is the “hidden” mechanism that poses a serious internal problem to 
the EMU system that makes importing member states dependent on loans from 
the ECB in order to keep the supply of Euros in the bank. This system is based 
on trust between banks and it is making a division between importing and export-
ing states. In addition to this aspect, the constant pivoting of the ECB on price 
stability failed to see the emerging bubble on the asset market and the new EMU 
structure should oversee the market and identify those distortions. Also, as Mayer 
showed, a political union is not possible for the European Union, and the danger 
that exists is its further dissolution because of economic problems. However, he 
is optimistic and thinks that lessons can be learned from history and that if crisis 
mechanisms had been defined with a lender of last resort; the EMU structure 
could become effective in dealing with the crisis. The gist of the current situation 
is clearly identified by the author and the possible failure of the Euro could lead 
to further disintegration. In my opinion, if member states want to retain the EU, 
they need to find a solvent mechanism that will function in times of crises, but 
one that would restrict fiscal imbalances. 
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